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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(e) , Utah Code Annotated, as
amended, 1987-88.
NATURE OF PROCEEDING
Defendants appeal their conviction for the Third Degree
Felony Theft, Section 76-6-404 and Section 76-2-412, Utah Code
Annotated, 1987-88.

Defendants entered a plea of not guilty to

the charges and were found guilty by a jury on the 22nd day of
January, 1988.

A Notice of Appeal was filed on April 13, 1988.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
I.

DEFENDANT'S WERE DENIED A FAIR TRIAL BY THE FAILURE OF

THE STATE TO REVEAL ORAL STATEMENTS OF DEFENDANTS IN RESPONSE TO
THE DISCOVERY REQUESTS OF THE CO-DEFENDANTS.
II.

DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR BY ALLOWING TESTIMONY OF A

WITNESS NOT REVEALED BY THE STATE IN RESPONSE TO DISCOVERY

1

REQUESTS.
III.

THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING AN INSTRUCTION CONCERNING A

CRIME WITH WHICH THE DEFENDANTS WERE NOT CHARGED.
IV.
OPENING

THE PROSECUTOR COMMITTED MISCONDUCT BY REMARKS DURING
STATEMENT

WHICH

REFERRED

TO EVIDENCE

WHICH

WAS

INADMISSABLE.
V.

THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE VERDICT.

STATEMENT OF CASE

The defendants were stopped by the Wayne County Sheriff as
they were leaving the Glen Canyon National Recreation Area in a
vehicle which contained seven head of cattle.

The cattle in the

possession of the defendants were neither branded, earmarked, nor
contained any other evidence of being domesticated. (T-73-74)
The defendants found the animals on open range located in the
Glen Canyon National Recreation Area and had assumed them to be
wild animals based upon information from third parties and their
observations of the nature of the animals and lack of any
indication of domestication.

Defendants believed they had the

right to obtain the wild animals for their own use and benefit
and were not aware of any claim of ownership to the animals.

The

loading and transport of the animals ocurred during daylight
hours and in a vehicle which was open to view.(T. 157-167)
2

The Sheriff of Wayne County, together with armed deputies,
stopped the vehicle of the defendants and took the defendants
into custody. The defendants were subsequently Jointly charged
with the theft of livestock on a single Information.
At arraignment, defendants entered pleas of not guilty.

At

that time, counsel for defendant Hatch filed a Request for
Discovery as did counsel for defendants Olsen and Warwick.
motions for discovery

requested

"any written or

statements by the defendant or any co-defendants."
of the defendants also requested

The

recorded

The requests

a list of witnesses

the

plaintiff intended to call and a summary of their expected
testimony.
The response of the State to the requests for statements was
that the State "had no knowledge of any written or recorded
statements of the Defendants." As to the request for witnesses,
the State identified several and indicated that future witnesses
may be called.

The State filed supplemental responses to update

the information as to additional witnesses which may by called.
Prior to trial of the matter, a hearing was held on a Motion to
Suppress Evidence and a motion to require the identity of an
alleged informant.

During that hearing from the testimony of the

Wayne County Sheriff, evidence of an oral statement of defendant
Hatch to the effect that he didn't know who the cows belonged to
was mentioned by the sheriff.

Defense counsel expressed concern
3

at not having been given notice of that statement and asked about
any other statements.

They were informed there were no other

statements.
Trial of the case was held on the 21st day of January, 1988,
at Loa, Utah.

At the time of the trial during the opening

statement of the prosecutor, the prosecutor indicated to the jury
that during the arrest and transportation of the defendants, one
of the defendants, Warwick, had made the statement "I am guilty
and I know it."

(T.15)

Immediately upon hearing the statement,

counsel for defendants requested a bench conference and expressed
surprise and concern over the failure of the State to notify
defendants that there were alleged to have been statements of an
inculpatory nature made to law enforcement

officers.

The

prosecutor took the position that only written or recorded
statements were required to be provided.

The court advised the

prosecutor not to comment any further on statements of defendants
and deferred ruling on the admissibility of the statements until
the time they would be offered. (T.16)
During the course of the trial, the State attempted to
introduce statements of defendants Warwick and Olsen allegedly
made to police officers after Miranda warnings but not recorded
or written. (T. 50)During argument based upon U.S. v. Bruton, 391
U.S. 123, the prosecutor indicated that there were two more
statements allegedly made to Officer Brinkerhoff which were in

4

the nature of admissions which had not been revealed to defense.
The trial court ruled that under the Bruton ruling, the State
would not be allowed to use the statements in their case in
chief.(T.50) During the testimony of Officer Brinkerhoff, the
prosecutor again attempted to introduce oral statements of one of
the defendants, Olsen, claiming that the defendant had said "I
didn't think we'd get caught."

The court ruled on the basis of

Bruton, that the statements were not admissible. (T.91) However,
the court

indicated that if the defendants testified, the

statements could be used during rebuttal.
Based upon the court's ruling, defendants Warwick and Olsen
did not testify, but defendant Hatch did testify.

Following

defendant Hatch's testimony, the State called Hatch's former wife
as a witness.

Counsel for defendants objected upon the grounds

that she had not been identified as a witness in response to the
discovery requests of the defendants.

The prosecutor admitted he

was aware of the witness but wasn't sure whether or not he was
going to call her.
her testimony

The court overruled defendants objections to

and allowed

her to testify. (T.187)

After

sustaining counsels objections to conversations made during the
course of the marriage, the court did allow the prosecution to
ask the witness whether or not she had had conversations with
defendant Hatch concerning the taking of cattle and allowed her
answer "Yes" to stand over defendants' objections. (T.192)
5

At the close of the case, counsel took exceptions to certain
of the jury instructions given by the court and objected to the
failure

of the court to give

defendants.

requested

One of the instructions

instructions

of

given by the court,

Instruction No. 15, instructed the jury that it was a crime to
transport cattle without brands or certificates of ownership.
Defendants objected on the basis that defendants had not been
charged

with that violation

and

that

the giving

of the

instruction would cause the jury to convict the defendants
because they violated that statute instead of the one with which
they were charged. Counsel further argued that it was not a
lesser included charge of the crime of theft of livestock.

After

the court had indicated he was going to give the instruction over
the objections of defendants, defendants then requested a lesser
included instruction of the crime of transporting cattle without
a brand or certificate of ownership. (T.206-209)
The jury retired to deliberate approximately 4:45 p.m. and
returned with a verdict of guilty as charged in the case of each
of the defendants at 8:20 p.m.

From that verdict, the defendants

filed an appeal.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The defendants submitted discovery requests pursuant to
U.C.A. 77-35-l6(a).

The State responded to the requests.

6

One of

the requests was for statements of the defendants.

The State

failed to inform the joint defendants that it alleged to have
oral statements made to law enforcement officers and others which
were inculpatory.

Over objection of the defendants, the court

ruled that the State would be able to introduce the statements in
the event the declarants or any of them testified.

Such a ruling

constituted reversible error.
Also, in requests for discovery, the State failed to give
notice of a witness.

The court allowed the witness to testify

against the defendants despite the objection of counsel for
defendants and the failure of the State to identify

the

individual as a potential witness.
The

court

committed

reversible

error

by giving

an

instruction concerning prohibited conduct of which the defendants
were not charged.

The giving of the instruction was improper and

could only increase the chances that the defendants would be
convicted of conduct with which they were not charged.
The prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct by stating
in his opening statement the alleged admission of one of the
defendants.

The admission was not allowed in evidence, yet the

jurors were made aware of it by the prosecutor.

The prosecutor

should have known that in a joint trial the statements of codefendants are not admissible against other defendants.
The evidence was insufficient to support the verdict.
7

There

was not any evidence introduced at trial upon which the jury
could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants had the
intent to deprive the owner of the cattle.

The cattle were on a

public recreation area, appeared to be wild showing no signs of
domestication, no brands or markings and no sign of any human
ownership.

The defendants had the right to assume that the owner

would abide by the state laws requiring branding of animals upon
the open range.

POINT I
DEFENDANTS WERE DENIED A FAIR TRIAL BY THE FAILURE OF THE STATE
TO REVEAL ORAL STATEMENTS OF DEFENDANTS IN RESPONSE TO THE
DISCOVERY REQUESTS OF THE CO-DEFENDANTS.
The three defendants in this matter were jointly charged in
a single Information alleging theft of livestock.

At the time of

the arraignment of the defendants, the defendants submitted
discovery requests to the State in accordance with the provisions
of Utah Code Ann. 77-35-16.

Both the requests of defendant Hatch

and the requests of defendants Warwick and Olsen requested the
State to produce "any written or recorded statements of the
defendant or any co-defendants."

At the time of trial, the

prosecutor referred to one of the alleged admissions of the
defendant Warwick.

Although the court upon objection from

defense counsel restrained further comment or reference to any
admissions during opening statements, the jury had already heard
8

the damaging statement.

During the course of the trial, the

State attempted to introduce evidence of oral admissions of the
individual defendants.

Although the court did not allow the

admission of the statements in the case in chief of the State,
the court did rule that the statements could be used in rebuttal
if the defendants chose to testify.

Two of the defendants,

Warwick and Olsen, were prevented from testifying as a result of
the court's ruling.
In State v. Carter, 707 P2d 656, the Utah Supreme Court
discussed the nature and extent of the duty of the prosecutor to
disclose inculpatory information to defense. At 707 P2d 662, the
court stated:
...As we have several times noted, a criminal proceeding
is more than an adversarial contest between two competing
sides. It is a search for truth upon which a just judgment
may be predicated. When a request or an order for discovery
is made pursuant to 77-35-l6(a), a prosecutor must comply.
To meet basic standards of fairness and to ensure that
a trial is a real quest for truth and not simply a contest
between the parties to win, a defendant's request for
information which has been voluntarily compiled with, or
a court order of discovery must be deemed to be a continuing request. And even though there is no court-ordered
disclosure, a prosecutor's failure to disclose newly
discovered inculpatory information which falls within
the ambit of 77-35-l6(a) after the prosecution has
made a voluntary disclosure of evidence might so mislead defendant as to cause prejudicial error.
Further, in State v. Knight, 734 P2d 913, the court found that
the duty to respond to requested information which falls within
the "same specification, it has to produce the later-acquired
material." 734 P2d at 917.

The Knight case also held that the
9

prosecutor must supply information sought which may not be within
his

own

file

but

is known

to

others

involved

in

the

investigation.
The

State

in explanation

of the failure to provide

information of oral admissions of the defendants to the defense
counsel, simply argued that the requests had only been for
written or recorded statements and that there were none of the
statements which were written or recorded.

Although the trial

court disagreed with that argument and agreed with the position
of the defendants that the introduction of the admissions would
be unfair in light of defense attempts to discover admissions
prior to trial(T.91 ) , the court did indicate that if the
defendants took the stand, the undisclosed statements could be
used in rebuttal.
Had the defendants known that there were admissions which
co-defendants had been alleged to have made, counsel could have
requested severance of trials.

In the case of Warwick and Olsen,

a conflict was immediately presented by the attempt to introduce
evidence which would, under the ruling of the court, only be
introduced if the declarant testified.

Counsel representing

Warwick and Olsen, Mr. Means, was put in an untenable position in
trying to serve the interests of the two individuals.

Obviously,

if his advice to Warwick was to testify, then the admission of
Warwick's alleged admission would affect Olsen.
10

Likewise, in the

case of the defendant Hatch, the fact that his co-defendants
chose not to take the stand in their defense prejudiced his case,
especially in light of the statements referring to Warwick's
alleged admission made by the prosecutor

in his opening

statement.
Further, where the defendants denied making any such
statements, had the alleged statements been revealed earlier,
counsel for the defendants would have had the opportunity to
investigate the circumstances under which they were alleged to
have been made and could have moved for their suppression at the
time of the suppression hearing heard prior to trial.
As set forth above, the obvious effect of the failure to
disclose the claim of admissions was to unduly prejudice the
defendants.

The remedy sought by defendants, prohibiting the

introduction of the statements, is one of the remedies available
under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 77-35-l6(g). The court in
Knight, 734 P2d at 918 stated:
On the other hand, if the trial judge denies the
relief requested under Rule 16(g), that denial
may constitute an abuse of discretion warranting
a reversal. An abuse of discretion occurs when,
taking into account any remedial measures ordered
by the trial court, the prejudice to the defendant
still satisfies the standard for reversible error
set forth in Rule 30, and the remedial measures
requested but refused would have obviated this
prejudice.
In the present case, the ruling to allow the statements as
rebuttal evidence did not obviate the prejudice to the defendants
11

as s e t forth above.
prohibiting

The remedy requested by the defendants of

use of t h e s t a t e m e n t s would have

removed

that

prejudice.
In evaluating Rule 30 application to cases such as this one
in which a review of the

record

would

not

provide

much

assistance, Knignt held that the burden is upon the State to show
that the error did not unfairly prejudice the defendants.

At 734

P2d 920, the court stated:
...However, when, as here, the error consists of the
prosecution1s failure to provide a defendant with
inculpatory evidence, the record does not provide much
assistance in discovering the nature or magnitude of
the resulting prejudice to the defense. The record
cannot reveal how knowledge of this evidence would
have affected defense counsel, either in preparing
for trial or in presenting the case to the jury.
In the present case, the defendants1 convictions should be
reversed for the failure of the State to provide

adequate

discovery.
POINT II
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERROR BY ALLOWING TESTIMONY OF A WITNESS
NOT REVEALED BY THE STATE IN RESPONSE TO DISCOVERY REQUESTS.
One of the requests for discovery

made by the defendants

was for a listing of names and addresses of witnesses the State
intended to call to testify.

The prosecutor gave an initial

response and then two supplemental responses listing probable
witnesses.

At the trial, the State called as a rebuttal witness,

the ex-wife of defendant Hatch.
12

The prosecutor attempted to

introduce testimony of conversations between the defendant and
the witness which occurred during the marriage.

The nature of

the testimony would have constituted marital communications and
the trial court upheld defendant's objection to the

admission of

that testimony although the judge allowed the witness to testify
that she had had conversations with defendant Hatch concerning
the "taking of cattle".

These statements were not furnished to

the defendants, nor was the fact that the witness was going to be
a probable witness for the State.

The prosecutor admitted that

he was aware of the witness but argued he did not have to reveal
her as a witness since he had only used her as a rebuttal
witness.
Defendants argue that the State cannot comply with the
purpose of Section 77-35-l6(a) by failing to list a witness known
to the prosecution

at the outset of the case by claiming

exemption from discovery on the basis that she was only to be a
rebuttal witness.

The attempt to use the witness was for the

purpose of introducing statements adverse to the interest of one
of the defendants.

Again, had the co-defendants been aware of

the State's intent to call the witness, they may have sought
separate trials.

Defense counsel may have been able to obtain

evidence to rebut or discredit the testimony of the witness.

As

set forth above, the cases cited therein apply to this situation
and the court committed reversible error by allowing this witness
13

to testify over the objections of defense counsel.
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING AN INSTRUCTION CONCERNING A CRIME
WITH WHICH THE DEFENDANTS WERE NOT CHARGED.
In Instruction No. 15 the court instructed the jurors as
follows:
No person may transport any cattle without having
an official state brand certificate or other proof of
ownership in his possession. Each person transporting
livestock for another person shall have a transit permit signed by the owner or the ownerTs authorized
agent, specifying the name of the person driving the
vehicle, date of transportation, place or origin or
loading, destination, date of issuance, and number
of head being transported.
Defense counsel took exception to the above stated instruction
upon the grounds that it alleged

unlawful

conduct

of the

defendants with which they had not been charged, had not been
given notice, and was not a lesser included offense within the
crime theft with which the defendants were charged.

The

instruction was a recitation of Section 4-24-17 of the Utah Code
which prohibited the conduct described therein.

The giving of an

instruction concerning a separate type of prohibited conduct
without first charging the defendants violates the provisions of
Utah Code Ann. 77-35-4 requiring an information or indictment,
77-35-5, providing the prosecution of any offense by commenced by
filing

information

or indictment, 77-35-7 providing

for

appearance before a magistrate, receive notice of rights
regarding the alleged crimes and arraignment or preliminary
14

hearing and then arraignment.
could only act to confuse

The inclusion of this instruction
the jury and

is thus

unfairly

prejudicial to the defendants.
Defendants1 convictions should be reversed as a result of
the court's error in giving the instruction described above.
POINT IV
THE PROSECUTOR COMMITTED MISCONDUCT BY REMARKS DURING
OPENINGSTATEMENT WHICH REFERRED TO EVIDENCE WHICH WAS
INADMISSABLE.
During the opening

statement of the prosecutor, the

prosecutor told the jury that the evidence of the State would
include a statement from defendant Warwick to the sheriff that
"We are not going through all that rigmarole."I!m guilty and I
know it." (T.15)

Counsel for the defendants objected to the

statement and the court did not allow the prosecutor to make
additional reference to it in his opening statement.
the jury had already heard the damaging statement.

However,

During the

trial, no evidence was ever allowed to be introduced as to any
such statement by the defendant Warwick.
Under the case law of the State of Utah, a prosecutor's
comments warrant reversal if the comments called the jury's
attention to matters the jury was not justified in considering,
and the jurors were probably influenced by the comments.

State

v. Slowe, 728 P2d 110.
There is no question as to the first issue.
15

The statement

made to the jury about Warwick confessing to the crime was never
admitted and the prosecutor should have known that in the joint
trial such a statement would not be admissible under the Bruton
case.
As to the second issue, where the jury was out over three
hours in deliberation, and there was a substantial question of
the intent of the defendants since the cattle taken were on
public lands and were unmarked or branded in any fashion, the
effect of such a statement on a jury would be substantial.

This

situation is similar to the case of State v. West, 617 P2d 1298
(Mont. 1980) in which the court found the prosecutor's recitation
in his opening statement of heresay evidence connecting the
defendant with the crime to be reversible error
evidence was never allowed to be introduced.

since

the

Also, in State v.

wiswell, 639 P2d 146, the Utah Supreme Court found comments in
the prosecutor's closing argument to the jury regarding the
defendant's silence after being advised of his right to remain
silent to amount to prosecutorial misconduct.
defendants

The rights of co-

to confrontation under the Bruton case and the

Constitutions of the State of Utah and the United States are no
less important and fundamental.
Defendants' convictions should be reversed based upon the
prosecutor's improper and prejudicial
statement.
16

comments

in opening

POINT V
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE VERDICT
Defendants contend that no evidence was introduced at trial
from which the jury could have reasonably concluded beyond a
reasonable doubt that defendants knew or should have known that
the seven subject cattle in their possession were owned by A. C.
Ekker, or anyone, or that the defendants were not operating under
a mistake of fact as to actual ownership and therefore that the
defendants had the necessary culpable state of mind, to wit, an
intent to deprive anyone of his or her property.
The undisputed facts of this case are that the three
defendants were stopped by Wayne County Sheriff Kerry Ekker on 29
August, 1987, in Mr. Hatch's truck which was pulling a goose-neck
trailer loaded with seven head of cattle.

The stop occurred near

the Hans Flat Ranger Station in Wayne County.

The three

defendants had just passed through the boundaries of a grazing
area or allotment to which the sheriff's cousin, A. C. Ekker, was
the exclusive licensee.

The allotment area consists of over

200,000 acres, comprised

mostly

administered

lands, the Glen Canyon National

(BLM) range

of federally

owned

and

Recreation Area, and a small privately owned land locked portion.
While A. C. Ekker owned exclusive license to graze cattle in the
allotment, he did not have exclusive possession; rather, except
for the small private portion all lands within the allotment were
17

and are open to public ingress and egress.

The Sheriff later

determined that all of the cattle were taken from the lands open
to the public.
A. C. Ekker's license provided for a year-round grazing
within the allotment.

His cattle remained on and ranged freely

within the allotment for the entire year and were not routinely
rounded up or moved to other summer or winter ranges.

Such year-

round right is contrary to the usual grazing licence which
provides for private grazing on the public land only during a
part of each year.

Ekkerfs year-round privilege is one of only

three of such licenses in Utah.
The Ekker operation was unique in addition to its year-round
use of the public lands.

His cattle were raised for sport and

rodeo roping and not for beef.

Consequently, the bulls were not

castrated and their horns were not "tipped".

This results in

cattle with a stronger horn base which will result in stronger
horns later that are more suitable to repeated roping and rough
handling.

The Ekker cattle were a longhorn cross-breed, not

typical to other herds in the State.

Because of the size of the

allotment and the fact that the cattle live and breed there yearround, and because they were not tended but lived their lives
roaming year round on the allotment area, a portion of the cattle
were never branded, earmarked, tattooed, or otherwise marked as
to ownership.

As A.C. Ekker testified:
18

Remember, it's rough canyon country, a lot of
cedars and pinion forest and breaks and the cattle are
hard to gather and they get wild. And, because we
don't move from winter to summer, we never get a
complete roundup. and a cow may grow up and be two,
three, four years old before we ever get her in corral
to brand her. We always brand them if we get them in a
corral . . .On occasion, we'll let a bull or cow get
away in order to wean a calf by catching it, tying it
down, and going back in a trailer and getting it. So
that's the reason for unbranded cattle. (Transcript of
trail, page 104, line 10).
The allotment
formations
formations.

area

is bounded

primarily

such as cliffs, rivers, and other

by

natural

geological

No signs mark the boundaries or otherwise give

notice of the existence or parameters of the grazing area either
along the various boundaries or at points where roads pass
through such boundaries.

The signs that do exist give direction

and mileage to landmarks and other points of interest, springs,
the Ekker family homestead, etc, as well as the entries into the
Glen Canyon National Recreation Area.
The cattle in the possession of defendants had no brands,
earmarks, tattoos, or other indicators of ownership.
male cattle were castrated.
daylight.

None of the

The Sheriff's stop occurred during

The cattle were being transported in an open-sided

trailer with no tarps or other coverings.

The Sheriff was able

to recognize the unique breed of the cattle in the trailer from a
distance of 1/2 to 3/4 of a mile.

When stopped by the Sheriff

the driver (Hatch) was asked who owned the cattle in the trailer.
His reply was "I don't know."
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Defendant

Hatch

testified

that

they never

saw any

identifying marks on any of the dozen or so cattle they saw
during the day -- either

from a distance or after close

inspection, that they saw no salt licks, litter, tire tracks, or
horse tracks, and that none of the cattle were tipped or
castrated or appeared in any other way to be cared for, but
appeared wild.

Hatch testified that after spending many hours

roping the cattle, the three parked their rig in the middle of
the only road into the area with the cattle loaded in the trailer
and napped for about four hours.

He further testified that

because of the lack of identifying marks, lack of signs of care,
and the rough and remote territory in which the cattle were
found, that they felt the cattle didn't belong to anyone but that
"we thought they were ours when we caught them."

(Transcript of

trial, Page 172, Line 25). He testified that had there been any
signs of ownership they would not have taken any of the animals.
In recent decisions this Court and the Utah Supreme Court
have each restated the standard of review of jury verdicts:
[W]e review the evidence and all inferences which
may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most
favorable to the verdict of the jury. We reverse a
jury conviction for insufficient evidence only when the
evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the crime of which he was convicted. State
v. Lactod, 90 UAR 46 (Ct App 2, September, 1988),
citing State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d at 1207.
On appeal it is defendants burden to establish
that the evidence at trail was so inconclusive or
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insubstantial as to preclude the Jury from properly
finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v.
Walker, 94 UAR 30 (4 November, 1988), citing State v,
Kereckes, 622 P.2d 1161.
In each of these decisions, the Courts have declared that it
is not the reviewing court's duty to reweigh the evidence,
rather,

ff

[s]o long as there

is some evidence,

including

reasonable inferences, from which findings of all the requisite
elements of the crime can reasonably be made, our inquiry stops."
Lactod, supra, citing State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342.

Also,

Walker, supra, likewise citing Booker, supra.
In this case, the evidence is undisputed that the subject
cattle themselves bore no outward signs of ownership that should
have been apparent to defendants, that the location and general
appearance of the animals gave no additional

indication of

ownership except to those persons with special personal knowledge
of A. C. Ekker's

particular operation, and that the defendants

did not attempt to conceal their activity.
supported the jury's verdict.

No direct evidence

Further, without additional direct

incriminating evidence, it was unreasonable for the jury to infer
from the introduced evidence that the defendants were or should
have been aware of the actual ownership of the animals.

The

conviction should be reversed for the reason that defendants have
carried their burden of establishing that the evidence and
reasonable inferences therefrom were so insubstantial that the
jury could not have reasonably found the necessary culpable state
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of mind, beyond a reasonable doubt.
CONCLUSION
The failure of the State to respond

to the

discovery

requests of the defendants fully by revealing the alleged oral
statements of two of the co-defendants resulted in prejudice to
all of the defendants where they were being tried at a joint
trial.

The statements were in the nature of

inculpatory

admissions which should have been provided to the defendants.
The failure of the trial court to prohibit evidence of said
admissions at the time of trial resulted in prejudicial error.
Further, the State also failed to give notice to defense
following the discovery requests and partial compliance by the
prosecutor of a witness known to the prosecutor and whom he
intended to call.

The court committed

reversible error in

allowing the witness to testify against the defendant despite the
objections of counsel for defendants and the failure of the State
to previously identify the witness to counsel to allow them to
prepare to refute her testimony.
Also the Court committed reversible error by giving an
instruction concerning prohibited and unlawful conduct of which
the defendants had never been charged.

The giving of the

instruction was prejudicial in that it created a greater risk of
conviction of the defendants by the jury than had the instruction
not been given.
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Also, the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct by
quoting in his opening statement an alleged oral admission of one
of the co-defendants.

The admission

referred

to by the

prosecutor was never allowed into evidence and under the cases
governing such matters the prosecutor should have known that to
comment on such an admission prior to its introduction on a joint
trial would be prejudicial to the co-defendants.
Finally, the evidence produced at trial was insufficient to
support the verdict of the jury.

The State has the burden of

proof and there was not presented to the jury sufficient evidence
upon which reasonable minds could find beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendants had the intent to commit the crime of theft
as set forth in the information-.
Based upon the foregoing, the defendants

respectfully

submits that their convictions in this case should be reversed.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

/

—

day of December, 1988.
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